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1. Introduction
The predominant view of public sector bureaus, as it appears in the folklore and in much of the
economic literature,' is that they possess monopoly power which they use to extract the taxpayers'
surplus. Since bureaus are organizations that lack a residual claimant, bureaucrats are constrained
to take these monopoly rents in the form of non-pecuniary benefits such as shirking on the job,
sumptuous furnishings, or other "perks". In other words, public sector bureaus are expected to
incur production costs which are above the minimum, technically efficient level. We will refer to
the resulting surplus as "fat".
In this paper, we intend to reexamine the foundations of the received theory of bureau behavior.
We will provide arguments that suggest the political sponsor is not exploited by the bureau's
application of its monopoly power. Instead, we argue that the sponsor may foster competition
within or among the bureaus he controls thereby mitigating the bureau's monopoly power. We
set our discussion of the sponsor's behavior in the context of a parliamentary system although the
results will follow readily for a republican structure. The political sponsor of the bureaus is called
a Minister and he is selected by the winning party's leader from the party's successful candidates.
In this setting, the Niskanen [1971] thesis and its extensions is that the solution to the bilateral
monopoly game played by a bureau and the Minister results in the bureau manipulating the agenda
so as to capture all of the rents.2
As applied to the Minister's control of the bureau, there are a number of reasons to question
Niskanen's prediction. First, since in many instances, the bureau cannot prevent entry it may not
possess monopoly power. Second, the bureau may be unable to effectively exercise any monopoly
power it may have. This is suggested by the fact that it must take its rents in a non-pecuniary
form. Since it is well known that the cash alternative is, in general, preferred, if the Niskanen thesis
were correct, one would expect the bureau to manipulate the game so that it could take its rents
in cash rather than in a non-pecuniary form. Finally, the traditional view ignores the underlying
incentives of the sponsor to curb the excesses of the bureau.
Because the Minister's position is contested within the party, the Minister has private incentives
to minimize bureaucratic inefficiencies. These incentives follow from the following institutional
facts. One, the position of Minister carries prestige, power and salary (i.e., the position is desirable
to the politicians). Two, the leader of the winning party, the Premier, selects the Minister from the
set of victorious members of his own party. The Premier has an incentive to select Ministers who
are successful and replace Ministers who are not. And three, success takes the form of minimizing
bureaucratic excesses so as to keep production costs down.
Bureau excesses are particularly troublesome to the Minister (and the Premier) since there
exists an opposition party which has it own incentives to detect and report incidents of such
excess. The opposition can take advantage of these incidents by representing them as management
(Minister) failures. This is not to say that the bureau will be required to produce at minimum cost,
1 See Borcherding 119831 for a survey.
SRecently, Breton and Wintrobe [1982, 19861, McKee [1987b] and McKee and Wintrobe [1987] have begun to question the
Niskanen thesis as it applies to competition within a bureau. We restrict our attention to the competition that the political
sponsor can induce. The reason for this is that internal competition does not preclude the exploitation of the political
sponsor by the bureau in the manner described by Niskanen. Such competition merely defines the residual claimant of
the bureau rents.
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only that it will be required to reduce political costs. Economic costs can become political costs
(lost votes) if they are successfully exploited by the opposition party. The preceding arguments
suggest that the Minister has a private incentive to minimize bureaucratic inefficiencies and that
the satisfaction of these private incentives should have a major impact on the division of the rents
between the bureau and the Minister.
Thus, we argue that the traditional view of the interaction of bureaus and political sponsors
is wrong. Bureaus are intrinsically competitive and are made so by the political sponsor who
has the incentives to do so. The nature of the competition facing the bureau will depend on the
conditions the sponsor can induce. Where there exists a single bureau, the Minister may exploit
the internal competition within the bureau by designing the hierarchy such that it extends to the
Minister's office itself.3 Where the sponsor faces two or more bureaus supplying the same service,
self-interested behavior of the part of the sponsor suggests that he will induce competition among
the bureaus.
In this paper, we concentrate on the behavior of the political sponsor who attempts to introduce
and enforce competition between bureaus. We have argued the political sponsor (Minister) has an
incentive to encourage competition between bureaus since he is able to convert such competition into
private returns. Further, we will show that this is reflected in observable features of the organization.
Our central hypothesis is that the Minister will exploit whatever conditions present themselves to
generate competitive forces within the bureaus under his control. Thus, if the historical evolution
of the institution has presented the Minister with two or more competing bureaus he will promote
a competitive environment by reducing, to the best of his ability, the bureaus' ability to collude.
That is, we hypothesize that the Minister designs the organization of the public sector bureaus
to promote efficiency inducing effort on the part of the individual bureaucrats and the bureau itself.
Technically, the Minister could always resort to direct control and monitoring of the bureau. This
would require that the Minister specify the nature of the output, so there is little room for shirking
or opportunistic behavior. and to credibly enforce this specified output. As one would expect,
this is likely to be an administratively expensive solution. The sponsor must rely on the use of
incentive-compatible or decentralized mechanisms. One such device, if the Minister faces two or
more competing bureaus that offer the same service or good, is to induce competition among the
bureaus. The Minister may be able to take advantage of their rivalry so as to induce more efficient
behavior without direct supervision. In this situation, the Minister's task is to prevent the bureaus
from colluding and thereby rendering his efforts ineffective by creating a competitive environment
among public sector bureaus.
In section 3 of this paper we formally model this situation as a duopoly game and explore which
instruments, under the control of a particular Minister, reduce the potential for collusion between
the bureaus. We test, in section 4, the predictions of our model with data from a particularly useful
example: public sector schooling in Ontario, Canada. This is a useful example because there are
two parallel public sector education systems which may compete for resources by contesting the
rnarket for elementary school enrollment.
We show that the Minister, by manipulating the instruments under his control, has achieved
the non-cooperative solution. He has successfully controlled the "game"~ between the cornpeting
bureaus. The Minister's instruments include legislatively specifying the individuals who rnay choose
3 See McKee [1987b] for an empirical evaluation of this proposition.
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which system to attend and stipulating the shares of revenue each system derives from local taxes
and from provincial grants. The result of these decisions is an increase in the systems' incentives
to cheat on the potential collusive agreement. The Minister's actions have made collusion by the
bureaus more difficult. The Minister's payoff is clearly shown in our empirical work as we show
that the result of his actions is a lower level of "fat" in the schools' budgets. Further, we show that
the efficiency gains are greatest where the game is most contested. We argue that our propositions
are general and that similar results can be found for other instances where the political sponsor
may create a competitive environment for the bureaus.
2. The Institutions
One can take two approaches to the presentation of a model of an institution. The first approach
is to set out the model and describe the assumptions as motivated by the relevant institutional
details. The second approach is to provide the institutional setting and then the model so that the
reader sees that we have captured the essence of the institution in the model. We adopt the latter
approach. The model is presented in the next section of the paper.
We argued above that the position of Minister is awarded on a competitive basis, by noting that
not only is the election process competitive, but so is the environment within the winning party.
That is, the position of Minister is contested directly at the ballot box and from within the party.
McKee [1987a1 has shown that the Minister of Education in Ontario has responded to political
competition by allocating proportionately more funding to the growing school system despite its
minority status. Here, we will show that the evolution of the position of Minister of Education in
Ontario and of the structure of the Ministry has had the effect of increasing the effects of political
competition at the ministerial level. We are interested in this in the current context since one effect
of this increase is to make the return to inducing efficient behavior in the bureau greater.
From 1846 to 1876, responsibility for education matters in Ontario rested with Egerton Ryerson
who held the position of Chief Inspector. This was an appointed position reporting to the Treasurer
and the Prime Minister. It was not until 1876, when Ryerson retired, that a Ministry was established
and the education portfolio became an elected position.
Until 1964 the hierarchy within the Ministry had the Deputy Minister reporting to the Chief
Director (Superintendent) who reported to the Minister. It is interesting to note that this structure,
with a bureaucrat between the Minister and his deputy, was unique and weakened the incentives
produced by the political process which we have referred to above. The Minister dealt directly
with the chief director (a bureaucrat) rather than a deputy minister. In 1965, at the time that
school district consolidation was being advocated by the Ministry, there was a reorganization of
the hierarchy which remains basically the same today.4 The Chief Director (Superintendent),
now part of the Policy and Development Council, has been moved out of the hierarchy and now
has an advisory role only. Consequently, the Deputy Minister now has a mnore direct link to the
Minister thereby strengthening the importance of the incentives induced by the political process.5
Along with this reorganization, the Ministry also delegated more responsibility to the local school
4~ It is interesting that the reorganization led to an increase in the irnportance of* the political actors relative to the
bureaucrats.
5 For more details, see Fleming [1971b].
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boards. They were made responsible for curriculum and other daily activities. In addition, teacher
inspection also changed: "As of December 31, 1968 provincial inspection [of teachers] had ceased
entirely ..." [Fleming 1971b p. 45]. The responsibility for evaluating teacher productivity passed
to the school principal.
All of these changes made the Minister more responsible for the performance of the school
system. Then, by the political process, this increased the Minister's incentives to eliminate bu-
reaucratic excesses. At the same time, the delegation of responsibilities for teacher evaluation and
curriculum design to the local school boards gave them greater autonomy. Thus, the end result
of the reorganization was to shift responsibility to the Minister but, at the same time, to limit his
means of directly controlling the local systems. Hence, reliance on a decentralized mechanism was
clearly indicated.
In summary, incentives exist to induce the Ontario Minister of Education to seek to reduce
bureaucratic excess via a decentralized mechanism. One method is to induce competition among
the bureaus. If competition is not fostered, the school boards will "collude" and increase the amount
of perquisites consumed by the bureaus. This would result in the bureaus exploiting the Minister
and the taxpayers. Thus, the Minister can try to hamper the efforts of the RCSSB and the Public
to collude. If the Minister is successful, he will significantly decrease the amount of bureaucratic
excess in the system. There are alternative methods such as merely "counting bodies'' and to
reward the system which increases its enrollment. 6 Clearly, both schemes, as well as others, could
work and the Minister would have the incentive to choose the least costly alternative. An analysis
of the differences in the costs of administering these schemes is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our purpose is to determine whether the mechanism does "work" rather than find conditions under
which it might be the optimal scheme.
In Ontario, the public sector schooling system at the elementary level (Grades K through 8)
is divided into local school districts which are organized as counties or large metropolitan areas.
Within each school district are two publicly funded school boards. There is a non-denominational
board, labelled Public, and a Roman Catholic board labelled Roman Catholic Separate School
Board, RCSSB. The unique feature of the public sector schools in Ontario is that many, but not
all. parents may send their children to either the Public or the RCSSB in their area. Perhaps more
importantly, this choice also determines the share of the local property tax accruing to each of the
schools and the assignment of the Provincial grant. The choice is free to Roman Catholics. To
qualify as Roman Catholic for the purposes of school choice, one parent must declare him(her)self
to be of the Roman Catholic faith. Approximately 35% of the families in Ontario qualify on this
basis. Consequently, parents who qualify as Roman Catholic are permitted to move their children
AND their local tax liabilities between the Public and the RCSSB. The net result, to the gaining
system, is an increase in revenue from the per pupil from the Provincial grant and the larger share
of the local property tax bill.
The definition of "Roman Catholic" for the purposes of schooling choice is controlled by the
Minister under the terms of the Education Act (19741 and this is one of the instruments available
to the Minister to prevent the bureaus from colluding to increase the amount of "fat" in their
budgets. Over the past thirty years the Minister has relaxed the conditions under which a person
may declare him(her)self Roman Catholic for the purposes of school choice. During the 1950's
a parent was required to furnish a letter from the parish priest testifying that the parent was a
6 In their recent paper, Breton and Wintrobe [1986] analyzed just such a mechanism which was used to foster competition
in the extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany.
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"practicing Roman Catholic". By the early 1970's a parent needed only to sign a civil declaration
to that effect. We understand the Minister does not engage in any verification activities. The effect
of this relaxation has been to increase the number of parents who may shift their children to the
RCSSB. In the next section we show that the effect of this policy action has been to reduce the
ability of the bureaus to maintain the collusive outcome.
Each board receives revenues from two main sources: local taxes and Provincial grants. The
per pupil grants are set by the Minister to compensate for differentials in the tax bases assigned
to the two boards. As we explain in more detail below, the Public tax base is significantly larger
than the RCSSB's. This means that the Provincial grant to the RCSSB is larger than the grant to
the Public. Regardless, the amount of the grant is set so that either board can provide the basic
level of education if their tax rate is equal to that rate which is appropriate, in the Minister's view,
for the neediest board. That is, the Minister decides on a tax rate that he feels is appropriate for
the neediest board, sets that board's grant so that the board can fund basic education if taxes are
levied according to this tax rate, and then the Minister adjusts the grants for the other boards
taking account of the fact that they are more prosperous.
Additional or discretionary expenditures by the local school board must be financed from local
property taxes which are obviously under the control of the residents of the school district because
their approval must be sought. It is possible to conceptually divide school expenditures into "real"
educational expenditures and "slack". The taxpayers, by controlling the tax level, can control total
expenditures and the Minister can control the division of these expenditures between real and slack
by creating a competitive environment. We intend to use the local tax level to measure the slack
or "fat" in the bureau's budget. If we control for differences in the local demand for educational
services, then differences in the tax levels will reflect differences in the amount of slack.
As we noted above, the property tax base is not assigned uniformly. In particular, the RCSSB
has access only to the residential tax base of those who designate support for the RCSSB. The
remainder of the tax base (all other residential, all commercial, and all industrial) is assigned to
the Public school board. Thus, in any given district, the portion of expenditures financed from
provincial grants is much higher for the RCSSB than the Public.7 In other words, the Minister
chooses which local property taxes, i.e., which local tax bases, are shared by the two boards and
which are assigned exclusively to the Public.
The result of the tax and grant assignment is that in the event that a declared Roman Catholic
switches to the RCSSB, the Provincial grants adjust so that the total per pupil revenue remains
the same for both boards. Thus, the parents cannot reduce their total (local plus provincial) tax
obligations by altering the school their children attend. This implies that parents will choose the
school system for their children on the basis of the quantity of "real" education expenditure offered
by each system.8 Thus the actions of the Minister have defined one margin on which the bureaus
may compete for pupils: the level of "real" educational expenditure.
The Minister, via the Education Act [1974], has limited the bureaus' discretion in this regard
too. In particular, the length of the school day, the length of the school year and the age range
of compulsory schooling have been imposed by the Minister. All of these are easily verified by
I Currently the proportions for the Public are approxirnately 50% tax and 50% grant while the figures for the R CSSB are
20% and 80%, respectively.
8 In cases where parents have had a choice of public sector schools to send their children it has been reported that the
parents incurred considerable search costs in selecting their child(ren)'s school. See Nault and Uchitelle [1982].
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the Minister and serve to limit some of the margins on which the schools may compete for pupils.
However, there is considerable lattitude left to the local boards as to the choice of the level of
educational services to provide. Most significant is the possibility of providing smaller classes
and/or enriched programs such as music or art. Further, the bureau may increase the amount
of services provided to the parents by extending the age range of schooling beyond the Minister-
mandated compulsory age range. In the case of elementary level schooling this will involve offering
schooling to younger children and in Ontario this is manifest as the provision of four year old
kindergarten. These increase the availability of resources to the parents and the pupils. Another
means of doing this is to provide transportation to the pupils who live more than a short walk to
the school since this relieves the parent of the necessity of driving or walking very young children
to school. Thus, the Minister has restricted the areas in which the bureaus may compete in an
attempt to increase the level of real services available to the parents/voters.
Recall that, the assignment of the tax bases to the school systems is not uniform and the result
is that the Provincial per pupil grant is much larger for the RCSSB. We interpret this to be a
conscious action on the part of the Minister. When we review the history we find that the Ministry
has refused all requests from the RCSSB (or its representatives) to assign the tax revenues of all
Roman Catholic's to the RCSSB thereby permitting the Roman Catholic's to choose whether or
not to support the RCSSB.9 In our presentation of the model it will be shown that the action of the
Minister in maintaining the revenue structure increases the likelihood that a collusive agreement
between the bureaus to increase budget "fat" will break down.
Further, the consolidation of school districts in 1969 reduced the ability of a small group of
parents to change the composition of the school board because the new school boards served a
large geographic area, Thus, a parent who was unhappy with his child(ren)'s schooling would be
more likely to contemplate a switch of institution (RCSSB to Public or vice versa) as his ability to
manipulate the school system originally chosen had been greatly reduced.
Finally, the Minister has precluded the development of mechanisms which would facilitate side
payments between the bureaus by limiting the scope of joint provision of educational services. Were
the scope not limited, the boards could use this joint provision to facilitate side payments.10 Of
course, collusive agreements between the school systems cannot be contractual because they cannot
be enforced through the courts. This means that any collusive agreement between the school boards
must be self-enforcing.
Since the Minister derives benefits from reducing excess, and since fostering competition among
the school boards does reduce their excesses, it follows that the Minister will design the institution
so as to promote a non-cooperative outcome. If the Public and the RCSSB do collude, they will
maximize their joint ability to extract rents from the Minister and indirectly, from the taxpayers.
The Minister must overcome this problem if the school systems are to move toward an outcome
in which bureaucratic excess is minimized, an outcome in which the welfare of the taxpayers is
maximized.
9One of the reasons that the Ontario school system is such a useful example is that Ontario is unique among the Provinces
in retaining the Roman Catholic's freedom of choice. This appears to have been the result of Ryerson's regime. He felt
that the demand for Roman Catholic schools would erode as the religious intolerance of the time disappeared and therefore
he wanted Roman Catholics to have a free choice of schooling. In Ryerson's view the Public system was the legitimate
public sector school system and the RCSSB was to be accepted as a short term device, at best, necessitated by the terms
tunder which Ontario entered Confederation.
10 Obviously, the Minister cannot monitor this joint provision carefully enough to know that the boards are sharing costs
as he desires. Hence, by altering the sharing rule, the boards can engage in side payments.
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In the presentation of the model and empirical evidence which follows we show that the Public
and RCSSB do compete rather than collude and that this favors the parents/taxpayers as well as
the Minister since the bureaus compete by reducing the level of slack in their budgets. We show
further, that one can interpret the Minister's actions as structuring the game so that the payoff
is very high if one of the school systems defects from the collusive agreement. Our intention is
to argue that many policy decisions of the Minister have had the effect of increasing the rivalry
between the school systems. These decisions include the Minister's and the court's restrictions
on the tax base available to the RCSSB (it includes only the residential property of those who
choose to attend the RCSSB) and the definition of the fraction of the market that is contested (the
definition of "Roman Catholic" for school purposes).
The other economic agents can be introduced briefly. The local political actors are the school
board, made up of elected trustees, and the municipal council, also elected. While the school budget
is not voted directly in a referendum process each year, the existence of political competition at the
local level suggests we may adopt the median voter model to explain the gross level of schooling
expenditure. Parents as well as non-parents may vote in the election of the trustees and the
municipal council.
The school bureau is assumed to have an objective function which is increasing in budget "fat"
or "perks". While maximization of this slack may be overly simplistic it is clear that the bureau
will wish to expand its perks.
To summarize, the local property tax rate is under the control of the residents of the school
district. The Provincial grants to both boards in a school district is under the Minister's control.
The Minister also controls the assignment of the property tax base. That is, the Minister decides
whether the taxes paid on a given property may be assigned by the owner to one of the school boards
or not. Lastly, through the definition of who is Roman Catholic, the Minister determines which
owners of said property have the right to assign their property taxes to one of the boards. Thus
the Minister determines both who has the right to assign property taxes and on which property
this right may be applied.
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3. The Model
In this section we model the rivalry between the Public and the RCSSB as a non-cooperative
game. We intend to use this model to provide testable hypotheses that the Minister actually is
trying to promote competition between the school bureaus by taking the actions we described in
the previous section. Consequently, our purpose is to examine the actions of the Minister as they
affect the payoffs to the bureaus from adopting the collusive strategy. Our argument for focusing
on the behavior of the Minister is that he (i.e. the position) has been assigned the property rights
to the set of instruments which determine the outcome of the non-cooperative game played by the
Public and the RCSSB. The outcome of the game is determined once the Minister has selected the
parameters under his control.
Our model of collusion is based upon the seminal work of Friedman [1971). He appears to be
the first to model collusion as the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the players. Many
extensions to his work have appeared. They include, Green and Porter [1984;, Abreu [1984], and
Segerstrom [1985a, 1985b]. Our decision to use this structure follows from the fact that it restricts
the analysis to those collusive agreements that can be maintained without written, enforceable
contracts. Since the systems are prohibited from using third parties to enforce contracts, the only
enforceable collusive agreements are those that are supported as the outcome of a non-cooperative
game.
The players are the Public school system and the Roman Catholic school system who play
an infinitely repeated game of complete but imperfect information. Each period they observe
the previous period's "real" education expenditures of their rival and choose a "real" education
expenditure for the current period. "Real" expenditures refer to the cost minimizing level of
expenditures incurred in providing a desired level of schooling and is distinct from expenditures
on "slack" or costs above this minimum which serve only to increase the utility of the bureau. We
model the bureaus' rivalry by recognizing that some parents are permitted to choose which school
their children will attend. We assume that this decision is based upon the current period's "real"
expenditures by the two school systems which the parents are able to observe. That is, ceteris
paribus, parents will choose the system offering the greater level of real expenditure as it should be
associated with the system offering the greater level of educational services.
All that remains is to describe the payoff functions for the two systems and to write the model
formally. We recognize that modelling the systems as profit maximizes is inappropriate. However,
we do believe that the systems' ability to extract perquisites does depend on the residual between
revenues and "real" educational expenditures. In other words, the amount of slack in the budget
is monotonically related to the quantity of perquisites consumed. Consequently, we will model the
systems as attempting to maximize this slack, recognizing that the system does not take its payoff
in money but instead spends the money on items it wishes to consume.ll
Formally, we consider a supergame which is composed of the following stage game repeated
indefinitely. The stage game has two players, the Public and the Roman Catholic school systems
who choose educational expenditures (henceforth we will describe "real" educational without the
11 For the theory that we are developing, assuming that the systems maximize slack imposes no loss of generality because
the systems will maximize slack as a precursor to maximizing their own utility. Unfortunately, the difference between
taking one's payoff in money rather than discretionary spending will pose a more serious problem for the empirical testing
of our hypothesis.
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adjective since we have called the residual "slack") without knowing their rival's choice in this
stage.12 The systems compete for students by incurring larger education expenditures. We assume
that there are N students in total but only yN, for some y E (0, 1), are contested by the systems.
Our restriction that y E (0, 1) is imposed because only a subset of all school-aged children can
choose to go to the Roman Catholic schools. We simplify the description of the choice of school to
attend by assuming that the number of children that attend the Public school, N,, as a function of
the per pupil expenditures of the Public school, e,, and the Roman Catholic school system, e,, is
N, = (1- y)N+ (1- a)yN+ e,- er.
Similarly, the number of students attending the RCSSB, N, is
N,. = cxyN +e, - ep.
Note that in the definition of N,, the first term, (1 - y)N is the number of students who have no
choice; they are required to attend Public school. The second term, (1 - a) yN -e, - e,., is the
number of students who are permitted to choose and who choose to attend Public school. Note that
implicitly, we have assumed that the Public school receives (1 - a) y1N of the contested children in
the event that the systems choose the same level of per pupil expenditures. Thus, a can be thought
of as a parameter that measures the perceived "quality" differences between a Catholic and a
Public education.13 We assume that parents wish to maximize the level of schooling their children
receive and therefore choose their school on the basis of the relative levels of real expenditure.
Finally, note that we have assumed that the number of students demanding RCSSB schooling is
linear in the difference in the boards' expenditures. This is done to simplify the calculations that
follow. Since the outcomes do not result in the enrollment of either of the boards being small,
this linear specification is a reasonable approximation. Lastly, we adopt the convention that e; is
the educational expenditures in excess of the minimum level of educational expenditures that are
mandated by the Minister. This means that choosing zero educational expenditures is equivalent
to providing only the minimum level of services mandated by the Minister.
As explained earlier, the Public school system receives the property tax paid on commercial
property and its share of the property tax paid on residential property. (Its share being equal to
the fraction of the children attending Public schools.) Thus, the systems' payoffs (budgetary slack)
from choosing e, and e,. are respectively.
s, =teC +[(1 - ay)N+ e, - ej [tR +9p- ej
s, = [a yN--e, - e] t-R - g, - e,
where t,, is the tax rate on commercial property, C is the assessed value of the commercial property, 14
t is the tax rate on residential property, R is the PER PUPIL assessed value of the residential
property, and g3 is the per pupil grant to the /* system by the provincial government. Since we
12 Recall that the players do know their rival's choices in all previous stages. They also know their rival's costs of inputs,
since both systems purchase their inputs in the same markets, and the revenues per pupil for their rival.
13 Under this interpretation, if a > then the Catholic education is perceived to be more desirable thari the Public education
and vise versa. Note ~also that any feelings about one system versus the other given equal educational expenditures is
captured by ca.
14 The best way to interpret C is that it is the property base on which the owner is compelled by the Minister to pay taxes
to the Public.
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wish to interpret s, as the i school system's discretionary expenditures, we must interpret ei as
the expenditures necessary to provide the desired level of "real" educational services.
Finally, we must describe the strategies available to the two systems and define our equilibrium
concept. Since we wish to examine the Minister's ability to reduce the potential for collusion,
Friedman's original model is adequate. Consequently, we assume that the systems may choose
classic trigger strategies. A classic trigger strategy specifies an action in the first stage of the game
and a conditional action in each subsequent stage. Classic trigger strategies restrict the manner in
which the action may be conditioned. The conditioning takes the following form: if your rival has
done some action, A1, in all previous stages, do B1, else do B2. The action B2 is usually referred
to as the punishment action as these strategies are traditionally designed to support collusive
agreements. Note that classic trigger strategies involve "harsh" punishment in the sense that each
player employs his punishment strategy in every period following the observation that his rival has
not done action A1.15 Specifically, each board chooses its level of educational expenditure for the
current period. Collusion involves reducing this level so that slack is increased and cheating on the
collusive outcome involves choosing a higher level of educational expenditure.
We complete the description of the game by specifying our equilibrium concept. Again, to
avoid unnecessary complications, we choose to focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Formally,
each player i chooses a sequence of functions, trigger strategies, o-(s) for s = 1,2, 3,... , which
constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
To describe the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which supports collusion by the school
systems, we must compute each system's stage payoff in three distinct situations: when they are
colluding, when they are not and when one "cheats" on the collusive agreement. We will do each
separately and then construct the equilibrium that supports collusion in the supergame.
We begin by analyzing the Nash equilibrium in the one period game, for it will provide the
payoffs to the systems in the event that the collusive arrangement breaks down. This is a relatively
straightforward problem in that we seek (e,, e;) which are the Nash equilibrium to the one-shot
game.'6
Lemma 1: The unique Nash equilibrium in the one shot game has
e~R 2 1 2 1e= tR + --+19r - N2+ Ry
3 3 3 3
2 1 1 1
e =tR +Mgr gp- y1N-N.
The most direct way to show that these strategies constitute a Nash equilibriur is to show
that they satisfy the first order conditions of the system's respective maxirnization problems. The
concavity of the systems' objective functions in their own actions ensures that both first order
conditions characterize a maximum, and that this maximurn is unique. The first order conditions
15 Most of the refinements of Friedman's work have focused upon relaxing the terms of punishment while still maintaining
the collusive agreement. As we will explain later, the boards' optimal trigger strategies are the classic trigger strategies.
This explains why Friedman's original analysis is perfectly adequate in this context.





=a = -ep+ 1 er+tR+g -(1 -ay)N
-- =0= -e,+ - ep+t+g,-ay .
der 2
A little arithmetic yields the desired answer and thus our Lemma is proved. Note that the second
order conditions for the maximization problems, a2 s,/ae, =-1, are satisfied. Also, for future use,
we have the payoffs that result from the one-shot Nash equilibrium as:
ee)= tC+ , [- g,+2N - ayN
s; = s,(ep, er) = Og,- gp+ N +ayN .
Further, we can derive the first order conditions with respect to the instruments available to the
Minister:
as; 2
(1a--)=-g,- gp+ N1';ayN >(-) 0
ag, 9
(la) 8-, = -2, p ~aN(1
8s* 2 F 1
g, [9- gP+Nc~ayN AN >0
and




(1b) a - - gr 2N - ayN (-1) < 0
ag,9r
s 2 1
- - -= - g p -g ,+ 2 N ia\yN< - -o N 0 .
The second piece of information that we need is the one shot collusive outcome. This may be
found by maximizing the sum of the slack in the two school systems with respect to the educational
expenditures of the two systems. The collusive maximand is
teC4 +[(1 - aoy)N + e, - e,] [tR+ gp - e+ [ayiN + e,.- e1 [ti R +g, e,]
It is obvious by inspection that this maximization problem has a corner solution in which (e,", e") =
(0, 0). For future use,
s' se,, e ) = teC+ (1 - ay)N(tR +F gp)


















-x N(tR + gy) < 0.
ay
The final piece of information that we need is the- one period payoff' to cheating on the- collusive
agreement. Consider first, the outcome if the Public school system " cheats," i. e., chooses its best
expenditure level under the assumption that the Roran Catholic school system chooses e,'. The
solution involves finding the value of e, which maximizes
teC [(1 - ay)N + e tR -t-9p- e
Simple calculations showv that the solution, - [tR + g - (1 - ay)N and that
~sp Tsp(ep,(e,)=teC+ tR+gp+ (- Ny)
The solution when the Roman Catholic school system is the system that "cheats" is found by
maximizing
ayN + e tR + g, - er
Again, simple calculations give 1,.=1j[tR + g, - ayN)', and that"
Sr s (ep,, ,). = [(tR + g, + ayN)}
Together, these imply
--. = [tR +r-ayN] > 0





17 Again, we assume that ~eg> 0.
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and






With the exception of one detail, we are now able to characterize the conditions under which
the equilibrium in the repeated game between the school systems results in the collusive outcome.
That detail is the discount rate(s) used by the systems. It is important to recognize that if the
discount rate is either 0 or 1, the model breaks down. If the discount rate is one, the "punishment"
is ineffective and collusion is not possible. If the discount rate is zero, the payoffs are not well
defined. Thus, we must assume that the discount rate is between zero and one, and for simplicity,
we will assume that the systems use the same discount rate, Q. Finally, note that the optimal
trigger strategy for the boards is the one that imposes the most severe punishment in the event
of a defection from the collusive agreement. This follows from the fact that without uncertainty,
there are no "accidental" defections. In a more complete model one could incorporate uncertainty
and apply some recent results by Abreu, Pearce and Saccatti [1986] to compute the optimal trigger
strategy.
Theorem 1: If |-g [ si-s| ;> ; for i= p, r, then the following strategies constitute a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
{es if t = 1
o-(t) = e; if Vs < t,car(s) = ej
e if for some s < t, os(s) -4e,.
The proof follows immediately from Friedman [1971]. The importance of this theorem is that
it allows us to determine, theoretically, what changes in the game make collusion more or less
likely. This phrasing is strange when one realizes that the theorem states that if a condition is
satisfied, the bureaus will collude and if it is not, they will not. We use the phrase to suggest that
there is really some uncertainty, in the Minister's or the researcher's mind, about the true value
of particular parameters. Thus, for any given probability distribution on the parameter space, if
the Minister, for all parameter values, reduces the difference between -Q[s - si, and si for some i,
the greater is the probability that the bureaus fail to collude. This is what we mean when we use
the phrase "the bureaus are less likely to collude". With this phrasing, collusion is more difficult.
the smaller is the difference between [1/(1 - ,3)j[si - si and ~si for ONE of the two systems. The
reason we emphasize one is that if either system finds it advantageous to cheat on the agreement,
the agreement is not self-enforcing. 18
Consequently, all that remains is to determine how the parameters under the control of the
Minister affect the incentives to cheat on the agreement, and then to test our hypotheses. Those
18 It is important to realize that the collusive agreement that we have focused upon is the equivalent of maximizing joint
profits. If it is not feasible to support such an agreement, other less profitable agreements can be self-enforcing. This
involves choosing the collusive expenditure levels closer to e . Notice that even if this happens, Ministerial changes that
reduce the above difference can be thought of as changing th~e collusive outcome toward e ,thus reducing the ability of
the systems to acquire perquisites.
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parameters under the control of the Minister are y, g,, and g, as well as the tax base available to
the Roman Catholic school system. Obviously, one would suspect that changing these variables so
as to intensify the rivalry between the bureaus would reduce the degree of collusion possible.'9 .
To examine the effects of Ministerial changes, it is useful to define
1
- s=
Our problem is to examine how A1 changes when the Minister changes the variables under his
control.
Our first testable hypothesis follows from an analysis of the effects of changes in 9p. From
above, we know that ( and a ' are both zero. Therefore;8gp 91,
_A 1 as;1_ 2
r _ ,_r-gp+Nay
a g, 1-# 
- Bgr 1 -
(9
which is obviously positive. Note that this immediately implies that a reduction in g, results in
the RCSSB becoming less likely to collude. Since we know that collusion is sustained only if both
boards are willing, we have our first hypothesis:
h,: The Minister can increase the likelihood of competition among the boards by
reducing 9,.
Similarly, we know thataP and a are both zero. Therefore,8 9r Gr
Bd 1 (as;) 1
89 1 - 9 1 - jJ9
whose sign is also positive. As above this implies that a reduction in g, results in the Public board
becoming less likely to collude. This yields our second hypothesis:
h2 : The Minister can increase the likelihood of competition among the boards by
reducing 9r.
The intuition behind these results is reasonably straightforward. Consider an decrease in g,
for example. This decrease reduces the benefits of collusion to the RCSSB because it induces the
Public to decrease expenditures in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This decrease is partially met
by a decrease in the RCSSB's expenditures which increases the amount of slack available in the
non-cooperative equilibrium. Thus, the penalty for "cheating" on the collusive agreement declines
as a result of the decrease in g,. This, in turn, rnakes it more likely that the RCSSB cheats on the
collusive agreement.
Note that in both cases, the magnitude of the effect of this change is larger the larger is g,- g1,
Analogously, the rnagnitude of the effect of a change in g, is larger the larger is g, - g,. Thus, we
19 As our focus is on the behavior of the Minister we do not explicitly compute the consequences of a change in t. Clearly, this
is under the control of the school district's residents and could be used to promote competition too. It is straightforward
t~o show that our model suggests that increases in t reduce the likelihood of collusion.
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see that the Minister has an incentive to make the difference between the grants large. Our model
does not explain which is larger but provides an explanation for why they do differ as we saw in
the previous section. This result also helps to explain the Minister's resistance to changes in the
regime despite considerable pressure to do so.
Since the difference in the per pupil grants is nearly constant across all school districts one
is unable to satisfactorily test hypotheses 1 and 2. On the other hand the fraction of Roman
Catholics (the contested part of the market) does vary considerably across districts thus our main
hypothesis for empirical evaluation is obtained by considering the effects of a change in y, the
fraction of people who may choose which school to attend. We will explicitly compute from
the derivatives computed earlier.
ar 1 -aN
(tR+ g,+2e;) + aN (t R +g, - "ep) .
By 1-,a 3
For this to be negative,
1 -atN
,,(tR + gp+ 2 ep) +-a N(tR + gp - e,) < 0.
A little arithmetic shows that this is equivalent to
2 2e;- ,
3 tR + gp - e,
Since e > e, the above inequality is certainly satisfied whenever
2
3
By the definition of ,, 8 = -,. where r is the real interest rate. Thus, a sufficient condition for an
increase in y to decrease the likelihood of collusion may be rewritten as
2 1
#p>- => - > r
3 2
In other words, a sufficient condition for an increase in the fraction of the students who may choose
which school to attend to decrease the likelihood of collusion is that the real interest rate not
exceed 50%. It seems reasonable to believe that this condition is satisfied. Thus, we have our final
hypothesis:
hs: The Minister can increase the likelihood of competition by increasing the fraction
of students that may choose which school to attend.
16
4. Empirical Hypotheses and Tests
In this section of the paper we describe and test a set of specific hypotheses derived from the
model. Recall that our central hypothesis is that the Minister chooses an environment (designs a
mechanism) to discourage collusion. Also, recall that the Minister's instruments are the assignment
of tax bases and grants to finance schooling, the legal definition of who has the right to choose
between the school systems (who qualifies as Roman Catholic for the purposes of school choice),
and the definition of the margins for competition by mandating a minimum level of schooling. If
he has chosen his instruments as we claim, the result will be apparent in observable features of the
organization. It is these features that form the basis of our empirical tests.
In section 2 we noted that the public sector school system in Ontario is organized into local
school boards or districts which have substantial autonomy over their activities. The local school
boards have some control over their level of expenditures. We suggested that collusion would take
the form of increasing the volume of bureaucratic excesses since the systems are unable to take the
extracted rents in a pecuniary form. Therefore, we expect to see this reflected in additional slack
and/or reduced educational expenditures. 20
We have cross-sectional data for school districts in Ontario. We use the data from 1978 because
it is the most recent complete data set. For any given year the difference in the per pupil grants to
the Public and RCSSB is virtually constant across districts. The RCSSB has received a larger per
pupil grant throughout the entire history of public sector schooling in Ontario. Our model predicts
that the more unequal the grants the greater the likelihood of the collusive agreement collapsing.
We cannot test this prediction with the available data since the differences in the grants to the two
boards do not differ across school districts enough to test the hypothesis.
Our data indicate that the fraction of Roman Catholic's varies considerably across school
districts. One of the conclusions drawn in the previous section is that y, the fraction of students
who are allowed to choose which school to attend, and the ease of student transfer between the
systems will be an important determinant of the amount of slack in the school systems. We believe
that a cross-section study of the behavior of the Ontario school boards provides an excellent
opportunity to evaluate this prediction of our thesis. If our argument is correct we will observe
more educational expenditures and less slack where y is larger and we may infer that the effect of
the Minister's extension of choice to a larger set is to reduce collusion.
Our analysis is organized as follows. First, we examine the behavior of the local school boards
with respect to the level of expenditures on educational services that benefit the parents of school
children. Second, we study the level of slack or "fat" in the budgets of the local boards. Finally,
we review the history of the Minister's actions on the issues of the conditions to qualify as Roman
Catholic for the purposes of schooling and on his refusal to alter the structure of the game. Casting
the hypotheses described above in terms of the available data, we have three hypotheses derived
from h3 above, each of which will be discussed in detail below.
Hi: Where the proportion of Roman Catholic's is higher there will be a greater incidence of
kindergarten for four year olds, smaller class sizes, and more non-required transportation.
20 Obviously, by educational expenditures, we mean those over and above the expenditures necessary to provide the minimum
education services mandated by the Minister.
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Our first hypothesis follows from the fact that collusion was less likely the larger was the
fraction of students that could choose which school to attend: the Roman Catholics. Obviously,
we are unable to observe the level of slack in any district. However, our model predicts that real
educational expenditures, e,, e,, are larger in the absence of collusion. In other words, e > e, for
i = p, r. It is very important to remember that e, represents the educational services, provided by
the school which are direct benefits to the children attending (or their parents). Thus, since we can
observe certain differences in expenditures for educational services, we will examine the effect of a
change in the fraction of Roman Catholics in a school district on the level of these expenditures.
Our empirical tests are hampered by the fact that the Ministry mandates certain minimum
levels of these educational expenditures. It also regulates the provision of transportation. In
other words, the Ministry limits the scope of competition between the systems in the provision
of educational services. In spite of this, the school boards are still able to compete through the
provision of educational services. They have the option of offering kindergarten to four year olds,
offering smaller classes, and/or offering some "enriched" programs.-' The boards are also permitted
to provide more transportation services than are required by the Minister. Thus we expect to see
more of all of these services in districts with a larger percentage of Roman Catholics, y.
However, before describing the tests of our hypotheses, we must provide some information
about the data set that we use. In the empirical work that follows our sample consists of 56
elementary school boards in Ontario (27 RCSSB) with enrollments generally greater than 3,000
pupils. We do not run the regressions separately for each type of school board because collusion
must be self-enforcing. This implies that if either of the boards has the incentive to "cheat" on the
collusive agreement, competition will have been fostered.
Before proceeding, we provide a brief description of the data employed in the empirical work.
The contested portion of the market for elementary school pupils is defined by the fraction of
Roman Catholics, %RC, in the school district. We use median income, Med Y, as a proxy for the
demand for educational services. It would correctly capture this demand if the median voter model
of the provision of public services applied exactly.22 We include a system dummy, D (equals one for
RCSSB and zero for Public), to capture any systemic regularity. Total enrollment, E, is included
in the equation for class size to control for the effects of the lumpiness of teacher inputs. This effect
may be important in the smaller school districts. . Lastly, we include the grant weighting factor,
G Wt, because provincial grants are awarded according to fiscal capacity relative to need. The
Ministry establishes a basic grant per pupil for the lowest need board. For the remaining school
boards the Ministry establishes a grant weighting factor which is multiplied by the basic grant to
yield the per pupil grant to the respective school board. For the boards in our sample the grant
weighting factor ranges from 1.023 to 1.152.
Our first hypothesis is that different measures of educational services should be positively
related to the variables that inhibit collusion. We regressed pupil teacher ratios (PTR) against the
percent of Roman Catholic's (%RC), as well as, rnedian income (Med Y), the system dumrny (D= 1
for RCSSB), the grant weighting factor (G Wt), and enrollment (E). The results are reported in
equation (Ri). The coefficient for %RC has the predicted sign and is significant at 90%. 23 The other
21 These programs include cultural enrichment programs, art arnd music, and advanced courses.
22 There is some debate on this issue (see Romer and Rosenthal [19791) but for our purposes this median voter model is
adequate.
23 Note that whether smaller classes contribute to achievernent is not important because parents perceive class size to be
important in and of itself as has been reported in various Gallup Poll studies.
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variables are not generally significant except for G Wt. The latter result indicates the school boards
use the increased grant to reduce class size which is consistent with the non-collusive outcome to
the game.
PTR = 38.934 - 2.351%RC + 0.000037Med Y - 0.494D - 16.735G Wt + 0.000015E
(6.29) (1.66) (0.60) (1.41) (3.08) (1.26)
(R1) R2 = 0.33 F5,50 = 6.46
where
%RC = the fraction that is Roman Catholic
Med Y = the median family income in the school district
D = dummy variable : D = 1 for RCSSB, D = 0 for Public
G Wt = the grant weighting factor
E = the enrollment in the school board.
As we noted above, the board may provide more transportation services than are mandated
by the Minister. This is usually done by offering transportation to pupils who live nearer to the
school. In effect, this service is an additional educational expense that benefits the family not the
bureaucrats. To see if this form of additional service was also more prevalent in the presence of
those features that we believe are related to less collusive environments, we regressed transportation
expenditure per pupil. T E/p, against %RC, Med Y, D, and G Wt. The results, reported in equation
R2, cannot reject the hypothesis. The coefficient on the %RC term has the predicted sign, transport
expenditure increases where the market is more contested, and it is significant at the 90% level.
T E/p = 721.36 + 59.09%RC - 0.00521Med Y +- 12.07D - 490.53G Wt
(3.15) (1.15) (2.48) (0.88) (2.39)
(R2) R2 = 0.152 F4,5 1 = 3.45
The dependent variable includes all transportation expenditure. School boards with a larger
rural component are required to spend a larger amount on pupil transportation and this is reflected
in their grant weighting factor. Rural areas tend to have lower income levels which explains the
negative coefficient on the median income term.
Another educational service that the systems might offer is kindergarten for four year olds. An
interesting and suggestive regularity is that the Public system only provides this service in areas
where the RCSSB also offers it. The RCSSB provides kindergarten for four year olds significantly
more frequently than the Public school board. One potential explanation for the RCSSB's behavior
is that it causes an increase in their enrollment. Parents cannot determine their affiliation child by
child. Thus, if the parents have several children and wish to send their four year old to kindergarten,
then they must send their older children to the RCSSB as well. Since the RCSSB's Provincial grant
per pupil is larger than the Public board's Provincial grant, then the RCSSB has a much greater
incentive to "cheat" on a collusive agreement by offering this particular type of educational service.
To test the relation between the %RC and the incidence of four year kindergarten we sorted
our sample of boards by whether they offered kindergarten to four year olds or not. We then
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used a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test2 4 to test the hypothesis that boards with a higher
fraction of Roman Catholic's would be more likely to offer this service. The test does not reject
the hypothesis. The Z-statistic is 1.623, significant at the 90% level. This lends support to our
belief that the RCSSB utilizes four year kindergarten to compete with the local Public board when
a larger fraction of the market is contested.25
Our second hypothesis is suggested from the direct observation that if the systems are colluding,
they are "consuming" a larger amount of perquisites than they would otherwise consume. Because
they are not able to take the benefits of collusion in a pecuniary form and because they refuse to
tell us how much of their educational expenses really purchase perquisites, we focus on differentials
in school revenues. Since the school boards must balance their budgets, focusing on revenues is
equivalent to focusing on the schools' total expenditures. We believe that if we control for the
other explanations for differences in expenditures, the remaining differences can be attributed to
bureaucratic excesses. The other explanations for differences in expenditures are captured by our
Grant Weighting Factor, G Wt, which adjusts for local tax base differences and local educational
needs and median income. These needs include capital projects, French language classes, extraor-
dinary transportation requirements in rural districts, and for other mandated services when their
costs differ across districts. 26
As our analysis suggested, if the real interest rate is less that 50%, then increases in the
proportion of Roman Catholic's, y, should make collusion less likely. Thus, we predict that the
proportion of expenditure financed from local taxes will be smaller in districts with a larger fraction
of Roman Catholic's. This follows because the Minister adjusts the local tax burden so that any
additional services as well as additional slack must be funded by local taxes. The use of median
income is designed to control for differences in local demand for educational services. Hence, any
remaining differences ought to reflect differences in the level of slack in the budget. Thus, our
second hypothesis is:
H2: The proportion of revenue financed from local taxes will be lower in those jurisdic-
tions where the proportion of Roman Catholics is higher and the level of administrative
expenditures will be higher.
In equation (R3) we have regressed the percentage of total expenditure financed from local
taxation, NetE, on the fraction of Roman Catholics in the population of the district and other
variables including Med Y. This variable has been included to control for the demand for educational
services. Thus, we expect that the coefficient on %RC will be negative and that the coefficient on
Med Y will be positive reflecting the fact that NetE must be higher so that the board can fund the
provision of the additional educational services.
Our results show that the coefficient on %RC is negative and significant at the 95% level and
the coefficient on Med Y is positive and significant at the 99% level. Thus, our priors are consistent
with our regression results. That is, our results do not reject H2 which suggests that the Minister
24 See Conover, 1982, pp 216-227 for details.
25 There is interesting anecdotal evidence to suggest that the Minister has also attempted to keep the school boards from
engaging in too much rent seeking. Apparently, some R CSSB's attempted to extend regular kindergarten to full day. The
Ministry refused to extend the grants to cover the additional cost.
26 Recall our discussion of this issue in the section on Institutions.
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is successfully creating a competitive environment.
NetE = -1.053 - 0.241%RC + 0.000019Med Y - 0.2591D + 1.063G Wt
(2.15) (2.01) (4.13) (8.81) (2.42)
(R3) R2 = 0.704 F4i = 34.18
Another method of determining whether or not an increase in %RC causes a decrease in the
likelihood of collusion is to study its effect on the level of expenditures on administration, AS.
Again, we include G Wt and median income to control for differences in demand for educational
services.
A$ = 0.017 - 0.0073%RC + 0.000025Med Y + 0.00975D + 0.00796G Wt
(0.82) (1.45) (1.32) (7.73) (0.42)
(R4) R2 = 0.549 F4,51 = 17.74
Finally, we have argued that there is a great deal of competition for the position of Minister.
We have also argued that he has private incentives to reduce bureaucratic excesses and that these
excesses are reduced by fostering an environment in which the systems behave non-cooperatively.
Together, these features suggest that the Minister should be unwilling to succumb to pressure
to change the environment such that the systems will find it easier to collude which is our third
hypothesis.
H3: The Minister will maintain the structure of the game between the Roman Catholic
schools and the Public schools despite pressure to reform it.
As a test of our third hypothesis we examine the Minister's response to the RCSSB's attempts
to force a change in the design of the game. Recall that it is within the discretion of the Minister
and the courts to alter the definition of 'Roman Catholic' for schooling purposes and to alter
the method by which local property taxes are divided between the systems. The courts have
ruled several times since 1900 on the issue of the RCSSB access to a portion of the taxes paid on
commercial and industrial property owned by widely held corporations. In each case the rulings
have affirmed the position taken by the Minister: in order to assign any portion of the tax payments
to the RCSSB, the corporation must demonstrate that the appropriate fraction of its shareholders
are Roman Catholic AND that they wish to have their taxes to go to the RCSSB. The corporation
has little incentive to incur the transactions costs necessary to meet the Ministry requirement and
the property taxes are almost universally paid to the Public.2 The precedent was set in Windsor
Board of Education (Public) v Ford Motor Company [1941]. This case arose because Ford paid
part of its property tax to the Windsor RCSSB. The court ruled that Ford must prove that the
fraction of its shareholders who were Roman Catholic was the same as the fraction of property tax
payments allocated to the RCSSB.
Another possible change would be for the Minister to eliminate the differential in the Provincial
(per pupil) grants to Public and RCSSB's. While the boards have petitioned for this, the Minister
has not done so. We believe that our results suggesting that the differential plays an important
27See Cameron (1972].
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part in limiting the boards' ability to collude is a reasonable explanation for the Minister's decision.
We also note in passing that the Minister has not established at mechanism to permit the Public
and RCSSB to make side payments.28
It is also interesting to note that the Minister has worked to increase the fraction of the
market that is contestable by relaxing the conditions necessary to qualify as Roman Catholic for
the purposes of school choice.29 Perhaps most significant is the fact that the Minister has increased
the volume of the grants to the RCSSB enabling it to equate its local tax rate to the Public's.
Prior to the early 1970's the RCSSB was compelled to set its rate several points above that of
the Public to cover deficiencies in the grant from the Province. Conceivably such a premium may
have discouraged some Roman Catholic's from sending their children to the RCSSB. The action
of the Minister coincided with an expansion of the share of elementary school enrollment in the
RCSSB. From 1960 through 1980 this share increased from approximately twenty-five to thirty-
five percent.30 Notice that the coincident expansion of the grants to the RCSSB is consistent with
encouraging a competitive environment [McKee, 1987a].
The empirical evidence in this section is quite strong in support of the general hypothesis of
the existence of competition between the Public and the RCSSB in each school district. There
is some further anecdotal evidence of this competition. In an interview, an official of the Ottawa
RCSSB informed us that they periodically search the property assessment roll and send letters to
Roman Catholic's who are listed as Public School supporters. These letters inform the recipient
of the fact that RCSSB mill rates are identical to those of the Public and that the RCSSB needs
the support of all Roman Catholic's. This is the sort of overt action usually described in the texts
as indicative of the collapse of the cartel. The behavior concerning four year kindergarten is also
indicative of overt defection from the cartel.
We note that our results do not and cannot determine whether the allocation of resources in
Ontario public schools is that which would obtain under perfect competition and private supply.
The equilibrium we observe is behaviorally competitive in the sense that it is non-cooperative.
That is, the tax levels are lower than would obtain under collusion but are not necessarily as low
as they would be if the boards' actions could be fully monitored, costlessly.
28 Having one of the board's provide a certain service and sharing the costs would be a reasonable mechanism that would,
without significant monitoring, allow the boards to engage in direct side payments.
29 See Fleming, [1971b].
30 See Education Statistics, Ministry of Education, Toronto, Canada (various years).
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51 Conclusions
The political sponsor of a public sector bureau has an incentive to promote competition between
bureaus whenever possible. If the Minister faces two or more bureaus providing the same service
and the clientele is mobile, then the Minister fosters competition between bureaus thereby reducing
their ability to collude. The bureaus will collude, where possible, to raise taxes and/or to lower
productive expenditure (effort). The combined effect is to increase the perquisites available by
increasing the slack in the bureau's budget.
In this paper we have provided a great deal of evidence which suggests that the Minister of
Education in Ontario has designed a mechanism, constructed a "game" between the RCSSB and
the Public, in such a manner as to encourage the non-cooperative outcome. The results are lower
taxes and higher productive expenditure where the market is more contested, i.e, in districts with
more Roman Catholic's.
The Minister has maintained the structure of the game despite pressure from the RCSSB and
supporters to increase the availability of the local tax base to the RCSSB. Where the Minister
has extended resources to the RCSSB, in recognition of its growing political power, the extension
has come through increased grants and, ultimately, extension of public funding through secondary
schooling.31 Both of these responses have maintained the pressure on the collusive outcome to the
game. In fact, the extension to secondary schooling has expanded the scope of the game.
We expect that our argument is general and that examination of other instances of parallel
public sector bureaus under a single political sponsor would yield similar results. Since there are
potentially many such cases, our argument and its empirical implications is an important extension
of the traditional public choice analysis of public sector bureaus.
31 The RCSSB was granted public funding to extend its provision of educational services to secondary school aged children
beginning in the 1986/87 school year.
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